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The process of devolution of power in the UK has allowed for a diversity of approaches to the management of our natural environment, set within a common framework 
of European environmental legislation and international 
agreements.  It has enabled all the devolved administrations 
to develop their own distinct approach and the evidence 
suggests that it has resulted in greater value being placed 
on the management of the natural environment not only as 
a key asset for economic and social development, but as a 
representation of national identity.
For example, in Wales, the principle of sustainable development 
was set at the heart of the first Government of Wales Act, 
making it one of the few administrations in the world with 
such a legal duty. The recent introduction of the Wellbeing of 
Future Generations (WFGA) and the Environment (Wales) 
Acts has built on this platform to provide a distinctive 
legislative framework for enabling sustainable development 
which has also included the establishment of new institutions 
such as the Commissioner for Future Generations and 
Natural Resources Wales. However the effective management 
of our natural environment must be part of a global approach. 
The UN Sustainable Development Goals (which have 
been incorporated in the WFGA), provide an important 
opportunity to create the appropriate infrastructure to realise 
this aim, but the level of the current UK Government response 
is not encouraging. 
The management of our natural environment requires 
structures that go beyond national borders and there is no 
doubt that the EU has been a force for good in setting cross 
border environmental standards, which need to be maintained 
and enhanced. Nevertheless, given the uncertainties brought 
about by Brexit, this change provides an opportunity 
for increasing distinctive devolved policy initiatives, but 
also the need to take a UK wide view of our key strategic 
natural resources.
Devolution can enable innovation and distinctive models of 
“made in….” forms of environmental management, but this 
needs to be supplemented by strong UK wide networks that 
can enable shared learning and collaborative action. The track 
record is not good in this respect, with the closure of bodies 
such as the UK Sustainable Development Commission. 
The UK Government will have to both respect the devolved 
administrations and enable environmental management 
powers in new devolved city region structures, but also invest 
in UK wide priorities and structures that can connect the 
parts of our 'sovereign state' with each other and with the rest 
of the world.
EDITORIAL
Devolution and multi-scalar 
environmental management
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British politics is in a state of flux. The scale (geographical and institutional) at which a country should be governed is a question at the 
heart of many of the debates currently filling the news. 
However, this is not a new question; indeed, the issue of 
devolution, or 'home rule', has been debated for decades.
HOME RULE
The first attempt to officially implement some form of 
what we now call devolution can be traced back to 1886 
and Prime Minister William Gladstone’s Government 
of Ireland Bill, or the First Home Rule Bill, as it is more 
commonly known1. This early devolution was driven 
from Ireland, although there was discussion that it 
may be appropriate to extend Home Rule to other 
parts of the UK. However, devolution was unpopular 
in Westminster, and political resistance meant it was 
not implemented until 1921, and then only for Northern 
Ireland. This system was suspended in 1972, and despite 
further attempts to introduce devolution in the 1970s, 
it was not until the election of a Labour government in 
1997 that the idea resurfaced.
Tony Blair’s Labour government began the process of 
holding referendums on devolution in Scotland and 
Wales, and on the Good Friday Agreement (of which 
devolution was an important part) in Northern Ireland. 
In each case devolution was approved, and Acts of 
Parliament then followed to establish the three devolved 
legislatures1. Despite these Acts, the UK Parliament 
remains sovereign, and retains the power to amend 
the devolution Acts or to legislate on any devolved 
matter. However, in practice it is accepted that the UK 
government will not normally take such an action 
without the consent of the devolved legislature2. 
HOW DOES DEVOLUTION WORK?
Although different electoral practices are in place in 
the devolved countries, in much the same way that 
Devo-what?
Robert Ashcroft explores the 
history of devolution in the UK 
and considers what differences 
Brexit might make.
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a UK government is formed, elected members of the 
devolved legislatures are nominated as ministers to form 
an executive. Officials in the devolved administrations 
then answer to these ministers, rather than those 
in Westminster. The devolved administrations are 
primarily funded through a block grant from the UK 
government, which can then be spent on any devolved 
matter of the administration’s choosing, with approval 
of the legislature.
WHAT ABOUT THE ENVIRONMENT?
In each of the devolved administrations, 'the environment' 
broadly speaking, is currently a devolved matter, and 
each administration therefore has “The power to legislate 
autonomously on a range of environmental matters”3. 
However, as the environment is a very broad and highly 
interconnected policy area, there are some complexities 
to these arrangements.
In this case, 'environment' can be broadly understood 
to include natural environment policy, protected 
areas, air and water quality, flood management, waste 
management, and other related issues. In each of the 
administrations, agriculture is also a devolved matter, 
as are forestry and fisheries in both Scotland and Wales. 
Although the devolved administrations are bound (as 
part of the UK) by EU environmental law, there has still 
been scope for the development of distinctly different 
approaches in these policy areas. For instance, the recent 
Welsh Environment Act, which received Royal Assent 
on the 21st March 2016, introduces a very different 
approach to that taken in the other administrations. 
The Act has been designed to embed an integrated 
approach to environmental management in Wales, which 
takes sustainable management of resources, climate 
change, waste, fisheries, and flooding in one piece of 
legislation4. There is a focus on wellbeing and resilience, 
linking environmental issues with communities and 
the economy. In Wales, catchment-scale management 
is also being embedded; a progressive step which other 
administrations will no doubt follow with interest.
CLIMATE CHANGE
Climate change is a slightly complex issue in terms of 
devolution. The entire UK is bound by the obligations 
set out in the Climate Change Act 2008. However, 
the devolved administrations do have a role to play 
integrating climate change and emissions reduction 
policies in linked devolved policy areas. As well as 
contributing to UK wide emissions reduction targets, the 
devolved administrations are also of course free to take 
forward their only climate change policies. For example, 
the Scottish Parliament passed The Climate Change 
(Scotland) Act in 2009, which commits Scotland to a 42 
“ In each of the devolved 
administrations, 'the 
environment' broadly 
speaking, is currently a 
devolved matter.”
The scope of the devolved legislatures’ powers and 
legislative competencies are defined in schedules of 
each of the devolution Acts. These either list subjects on 
which the legislatures have the power to legislate on (as 
in the Wales Act 2007), or list “reserved” or “excepted 
matters” on which the UK Parliament retains sole power 
to legislate, and state that all other issues are deemed 
to be devolved (as in Northern Ireland and Scotland). 
Since 1997, the legislative competencies of the devolved 
countries have been expanded through a series of 
reforms and amendments to the original legislation, 
granting the administrations greater powers.
Whilst powers have been transferring from Westminster 
to the administrations of Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland, some in England have also been calling for 
greater decentralisation of power through devolution 
to cities and regions. This was a plan of Tony Blair’s 
Labour government, but one which did not come to 
fruition due to a lack of public support. Under the 
present Conservative government this idea is gaining 
traction again.
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per cent reduction in emissions by 2020. The Committee 
on Climate Change reports that Northern Ireland’s 
Environment Minister and the Welsh Government 
have also taken advice from the committee and are 
considering options for climate change policies in their 
own administrations5.
ENERGY
Energy policy is also not straightforward. In Northern 
Ireland, energy policy (with the exception of nuclear) 
is devolved, however it can sometimes be influenced 
through legislative consent motions by developments 
in Westminster, as was the case with elements of the 
UK Energy Bill 2012.
In Scotland, energy was a reserved matter under the 
Scotland Act 1998. However, some powers have been 
devolved through secondary legislation, which allow 
350 MW6. This Bill is currently before committee in the 
House of Lords, and is likely to pass in 2017.
THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM?
As the brief explanations above demonstrate, devolution 
is a complex issue, which is compounded further by 
the interconnected nature of environmental issues and 
policy areas. However, it seems clear that in some areas, 
devolution is driving the development of progressive and 
innovative approaches to environmental management 
and tackling climate change. 
Although technically policy on a range of environmental 
issues has been devolved for some time, in reality, 
much of our environmental legislation is currently 
derived from EU law. As EU law is a reserved matter, 
the devolved administrations have had fairly limited 
influence in this area until now. Of course, there 
have been divergences in how the administrations 
have structured their environmental agencies, and 
how they have implemented this legislation, but 
much of the legislative detail in this area has been 
beyond their control. However, using the powers and 
flexibility available to them, the UK Environmental Law 
Association (UKELA) and King’s College London in 2011 
concluded that there had been significant environmental 
law developments in each administration, which were 
beginning to follow increasingly different paths3.
Although much environmental law developed by 
the devolved administrations has been driven by EU 
law, there is nothing to stop Member States (or areas 
within Member States, as in this case) surpassing 
EU requirements in their own laws. Scotland’s 
Environmental Assessment (Scotland) Act 2005, for 
instance, goes further than the Directive it transposes7. 
Scottish Ministers to increase the development of 
renewable generation through the Renewables Obligation, 
and grant them the power to make decisions on the 
development of power stations both on-shore (if greater 
than 50 MW capacity) and off-shore (if greater than 1 
MW capacity). Planning policy has been a devolved issue 
since 1998, and so in practice, the Scottish government 
has had fairly significant influence over the construction 
of energy generation capacity since this time.
The situation in Wales may be about to change fairly 
soon, as changes proposed in the Draft Wales Bill 2016-17 
would devolve greater powers to Welsh Ministers 
relating to licencing energy projects. If the new Bill 
passes, Welsh Ministers will be granted the power to 
licence onshore oil and gas (including fracking) projects, 
all onshore wind projects, and any renewable energy 
projects in the Wales on- and off-shore regions under 
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In this way the devolved administrations can use their 
devolved powers to drive environmental progress, whilst 
also meeting EU requirements.
Once the UK leaves the EU, and the framework of European 
law no longer applies, the devolved administrations will 
have greater flexibility on environmental matters, and 
it is likely divergence will increase. 
LOOKING FORWARD
Devolution is essentially a process of decentralisation, 
theoretically “Put[ting] power closer to the citizen so that 
local factors are better recognised in decision-making”2. 
Environmental policy is an interesting case for devolution. 
There are clearly cases where greater local control on 
environmental issues would be beneficial. However, 
where approaches and policies diverge, this can conflict 
with visions for an integrated, systems approach to 
environmental management. The coming years are likely 
to bring great change to the UK’s current legislative 
framework, and many challenges for the environment. 
If we are to tackle these challenges, seeking to maximise 
the benefits and minimise the risks of Brexit, it will be 
essential to develop a UK-wide vision for environmental 
policy which each administration can buy into, to ensure 
a coordinated approach to management whilst building 
on the successes devolution has delivered so far. 
Increasingly vocal demands for repatriation of power 
from both Brussels and Westminster have re-opened 
the debate about where decision-making powers on 
environmental issues should lie. This issue of the 
environmental SCIENTIST highlights several devolution 
success stories in environmental policy areas, and reflects 
on what we can learn from these cases. A series of three 
Analysis pieces offer a comparative exploration of how 
one important issue, climate change adaptation, is being 
addressed in each of the devolved administrations. We 
also present a perspective from the United States, and 
further analysis on what Brexit may mean for devolved 
environmental policy in the UK.
The policy landscape is in flux and the environmental 
sector needs to embrace new approaches to help shape 
future frameworks. This journal aims to encourage the 
reflection required, by carefully evaluating the options 
available to us, examining congruent domestic and 
international experiences, and highlighting best practice.
“ Devolution is essentially a process 
of decentralisation, theoretically 
Put[ting] power closer to the citizen 
so that local factors are better 
recognised in decision-making.”
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Devolution and  
resource management
Jonny Hazell discusses the 
approach taken by England,  
Wales and Scotland to waste  
and resource management pre- 
and post-Brexit.
For a subject that is far from the top of the Westminster Government’s in-tray, waste and resources policy has proved a surprisingly hot 
topic for the Scottish and Welsh Governments. This 
reflects a desire to distinguish themselves using 
one of the fully devolved policy areas and a greater 
sense of the economic and environmental rewards of 
greater ambition on resource management. By contrast, 
Westminster’s ambition has been limited to a desire to 
comply with the objectives set by the EU. So what are 
Scotland and Wales doing that England isn’t, and what 
will be the consequences of the UK’s vote to leave the 
EU on the growing gap in policy ambition between 
Westminster and its devolved partners?
RESOURCE POLICY IN WALES
Wales has long had great ambition and been a pioneer as 
a champion for waste and resource management, which 
has been driven by their constitutional commitment to 
sustainability and one planet living. They were the first 
country to introduce a charge for single use carrier bags 
(in 2010) and they have the highest recycling rate of any 
part of the UK, hitting 60 per cent between March 2015 
and March 2016. Their success is rooted in their 2010 
strategy “Towards Zero Waste”. This sets out a long term 
framework for making Wales a zero waste country by 
2050. Key provisions include:
•  A reduction in the amount of waste generated in Wales 
of 1.5 per cent a year up to 2050; and
•  A target of 70 per cent recycling in 2025.
These economy wide targets are complemented by 
sector specific strategies for municipal waste, commercial 
and industrial waste, and construction wastes 
amongst others1. 
Of these, their municipal waste strategy is particularly 
noteworthy given its success in both preventing waste and 
increasing recycling. At the centre of this strategy is the 
Collections Blueprint, which sets out the Welsh Assembly 
government’s preferred approach to organising local 
authority waste and recycling collections. To help local 
authorities adopt their preferred system, the Government 
CASE STUDYFEATURE FEATURE
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has implemented a “Collaborative Change Programme” 
which provides advice and financial support to pay for 
the capital costs of change. The success of their strategy 
is reflected in the facts that between 2006-7 and 2013-14, 
waste arisings declined by an average of 2 per cent per 
year whilst recycling increased from 33.4 per cent to 
54.3 per cent. 
Whilst their achievements are undeniable, it’s worth 
considering the costs involved. In 2013/14, Welsh 
expenditure on all waste and recycling activities was 
£82 per capita, as opposed to £67 per capita in England. 
The Welsh Government argues that this reflects higher 
capital investments which will be recouped from 
lower operational costs (as well as the challenges of 
their geography), and it is true that in 2015-16, Welsh 
expenditure per capita had reduced to £78. 
RESOURCE POLICY IN SCOTLAND
Like Wales, Scotland also has an ambitious plan for 
reducing waste and increasing their recycling. Their 
“Zero Waste Plan” includes a 70 per cent recycling 
target, separate collection requirements and landfill 
bans for particular materials such as food waste. As 
well as these measures, the Scottish Government’s 
“Household Recycling Charter” has a similar ambition 
to Wales’ “Collections Blueprint”, in trying to increase 
the consistency and quality of materials collected by 
local authorities for recycling. 
Scotland’s Zero Waste Plan is largely focused on 
improving the treatment of waste. So to complement 
this, the Scottish Government has developed a circular 
economy strategy, “Making Things Last”, which 
includes a holistic focus on waste prevention activities 
such as eco-design and remanufacturing. A notable 
feature of this strategy is support for the Scottish 
Institute of Remanufacturing, one of just six centres of 
remanufacturing expertise in the world and the only one 
in Europe. The Scottish Government is also providing 
extensive advice and financial support to increase the 
resource efficiency of Scottish businesses and help them 
EU’s “Circular Economy Package” to raise the targets 
and ambitions of the EU policy framework to similar 
levels to those of Wales and Scotland, it is now uncertain 
whether England would have to comply with these. If 
the UK are to remain members of the single market on 
terms similar to Norway, all the Directives that provide 
the framework for most of England’s waste and resources 
policies will still apply. 
But, if it’s a hard Brexit, the future is much less 
certain. Some targets, such as the 2020 50 per cent 
recycling target nominally remains in force having 
been transposed into UK legislation, but whether it 
would be enforced without the threat of an EU legal 
challenge is doubtful. Other rules implemented through 
EU regulations would be scrapped immediately, the 
most significant of which are the Ecodesign standards 
that make products longer lasting, easier to repair and 
recycle. Moreover, given the amount of time and central 
government resources that will be taken up by Brexit, 
it seems unlikely that we can expect any new policy on 
waste and resources in England. But amidst this gloomy 
prognosis, devolution provides a source of hope. As 
the government continues with its devolution agenda, 
newly empowered city regions have the opportunity to 
go beyond the limitations of central government policy. 
London already has a circular economy strategy, and 
as in Wales and Scotland, this is driven by a sense of 
an opportunity for local employment and economic 
regeneration, that greater resource management can 
deliver. If more English cities follow the example of the 
UK’s other devolved administrations, then they will be 
the driver of policy innovation and ambition. 
adopt circular economy business models through the 
publicly funded Zero Waste Scotland, Resource Efficient 
Scotland, and Scottish Enterprise campaigns. 
Despite these strategies, action on the ground is taking 
a while to catch up with the political ambitions. For 
example, Scotland’s recycling rate was 44.3 per cent in 
2015, lower than both England and Wales. But given the 
willingness to invest in improving resource management 
in Scotland, it seems likely that their performance will 
improve. 
POLICY IN ENGLAND AND THE IMPACT OF BREXIT
Unlike its neighbours, England has not developed any 
strategy or policy framework to go beyond the current 
EU targets. This raises a potential headache for the 
devolved administrations in Scotland and Wales as 
their efforts to improve resource management could 
be undermined by opportunities to dispose of waste 
in England at lower cost, particularly for commercial 
and industrial wastes. Whilst there are proposals in the 
Jonny Hazell is a senior policy advisor, focusing on circular 
economy metrics, comparative policy analysis, and resource 
governance. Before joining Green Alliance he was Research 
Director at Inovenergy leading the ‘The 1 Tonne Roadshow’, an 
event series promoting best practice in waste management. He 
also led research on the UK’s renewable heat market, reuse of 
materials in London, and social enterprise in China.
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Climate change impacts  
and adaptation in Scotland
Anna Moss discusses how Scottish Government 
policy has shaped their country’s approach to 
climate change.
Climate change is already affecting Scotland, with observed increases in seasonal temperatures, annual rainfall and sea level all beginning to 
have a measurable impact on our natural and built 
environments. Whilst the accumulative impact in 
Scotland is less severe than in many parts of the world, 
for individuals, businesses, communities and sensitive 
species or habitats the consequences can be significant. 
“ This is happening now, and 
how we respond will affect 
not only individual species  
and our distinctive 
landscapes, but also our 
lifestyles and economy.”
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epidemics are largely driven by the weather with 
periods of free moisture (high humidity, dew and 
rainfall) and moderate temperature being optimal 
for pathogen infection and spread. Liver fluke spends 
much of its complicated life-cycle outside the host 
cattle or sheep, either within vector snails, or as 
cysts or eggs on pasture; its prevalence, seasonality 
and geographic spread are very much affected by 
temperature and rainfall.
As with the rest of the UK, flooding currently poses 
the most critical risk to the built environment and 
infrastructure. Estimates of the cost of flood damages 
to property in Scotland varies from £200 - £250 million 
per year. Individual flooding events can have a huge 
cost - losses of £30 million were estimated for the Tay/
Earn flood in 1993 and £100 million for the Strathclyde 
flood in 1994. These events damage homes, businesses 
and communities, disrupt transport, and cause local 
economic losses. But there is also a need for research 
to improve our understanding of:
•  the impacts of flooding beyond the initial phase of 
recovery;
•  the impacts on mental health; and
•  the disparity between impacts at community level, 
as currently we are not able to count the true cost at 
individual, local and national level.
IS SCOTLAND UNIQUE?  
Scotland has a third of the UK’s land area, but only 
about 8 per cent of the population. There are therefore 
large remote areas with very low population density, 
including around 100 inhabited islands. This can 
influence the character or magnitude of vulnerability 
and realised impacts for those regions. Increases 
in flooding and landslides threaten the transport 
network particularly in areas with single arterial 
routes. Potential increases in storminess (though more 
evidence is required) are a particular threat to island 
communities if ferries remain in port for safety, and 
also cause havoc to the transport network when major 
bridges close.
Although not unique to Scotland, there are some 
issues which are more critical due to the relative 
importance in comparison to the rest of the UK. For 
example, Scotland contains over 90 per cent of the UK’s 
surface freshwater, over 60 per cent of the UK’s total 
sea area, and two thirds of the UK conifer woodland 
and peatland. Therefore impacts felt right across the 
UK in these environments are relatively more critical 
within Scotland. A large proportion of Scotland’s 
peatlands already have evidence of degradation and 
warmer/drier conditions will exacerbate the impact 
on an already stressed system. Changes to water 
temperature, flow and water quality will be critical 
for many important freshwater species in Scotland’s 
lochs and rivers. Increasing marine temperature 
and acidification is already seeing an increase 
in warm water species and threatens Scotland’s 
shellfish industry.
There are also potential opportunities for Scottish 
agriculture, which probably outweigh those for many 
parts of the UK which are more restricted due to water 
availability such as:
•  an increase in the growing season;
•  an increase in types of crops that can be 
   successfully grown.
However, there are some areas where more water-hungry 
crops may be restricted by the need to reduce reliance 
on irrigation (potatoes and soft fruits) as well as 
increasing risks regarding soil condition (erosion and 
loss of soil carbon).
CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY IN SCOTLAND
Climate change policy in Scotland responds to both a 
UK and a Scottish framework (the UK Climate Change 
Act 2008 and the Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009). 
As a requirement of the UK Act, a Climate Change Risk 
Assessment (CCRA) for each of the nations is conducted 
every five years (the 2017 Evidence Report has just been 
published). This forms the basis for adaptation policy 
in Scotland and the first Scottish Climate Change 
Adaptation Programme (SCCAP), published in 2014, 
Climate change is one of the greatest challenges facing 
Scotland's natural environment. The rate of change 
threatens species and habitats that are unable to adapt 
quickly enough. This is happening now, and how we 
respond will affect not only individual species and 
our distinctive landscapes, but also our lifestyles 
and economy. We are already seeing shifts in species 
distribution, for instance bird species wintering at 
higher latitudes, and range shifts in butterflies. However, 
movement to new areas depends on suitable habitat 
being available and some species can only survive in 
a very narrow range of environmental conditions (e.g. 
snow bed specialists), or are already at the southern limit 
of their range in Scotland or restricted by the landscape 
(e.g. cold water species in lochs). The changing climate 
is also impacting on the distribution and abundance of 
invasive species, pests and diseases for example:
•  It is believed that an increase in intense rainfall 
episodes coupled with warmer springs may have 
optimised conditions for spore dispersal of Dothistroma 
(“Red Band”) needle blight, which has become the 
most significant disease affecting coniferous trees 
in the UK and poses a particular threat not only to 
Scotland’s commercial forestry, but also to native 
Caledonian pinewoods; 
•  Two of the pests and diseases most economically 
damaging for Scotland’s agriculture are both 
significantly influenced by climate.  Potato late blight 
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addresses the risks and opportunities identified for 
Scotland and sets out the Scottish Government’s policies 
and proposals to address them. 
ADAPTATION IN SCOTLAND
Climate change adaptation is becoming increasingly 
embedded in policy and practice, though there is still 
a long way to go to ensure adaptation is mainstreamed 
throughout all sectors and at all levels, and strategies/
principles need to be backed up by focused measures 
and management changes.
The scale of the impact is often related to the general 
resilience of the environment or system. For example, 
the ability for species to track suitable climate space 
depends on the availability of suitable habitat to move to, 
but in many cases the surrounding habitat may already 
be fragmented and/or in poor condition. Strengthening 
resilience is key in many areas, particularly in the 
natural environment. Rising temperatures or changes to 
precipitation are now inevitable, therefore often the most 
effective action is to focus on reducing other pressures, 
thereby reducing the vulnerability and increasing 
resilience. An emphasis on resilience is therefore a 
key part of a number of policy areas (e.g. The Scottish 
Biodiversity Strategy) and Scotland’s new National 
Centre for Resilience is expected to play an important 
role in taking the resilience agenda forward, supporting 
adaptation and ensuring communities across the country 
are fully and adequately prepared.
Often a whole suite of measures need to be in place 
to maintain or improve resilience. For example, if we 
consider Scotland’s woodland, there are a large number 
of policy areas that combine to contribute to adaptation: 
•  increasing diversity of forest tree species (a 
key adaptation strategy identified in Forestry 
Commission Scotland’s (FCS) Climate Change 
Programme); 
•  improving habitat connectivity (e.g. Central 
Scotland Green Network); 
•  the prevention of excessive deer browsing 
(Forest Enterprise Scotland Deer Management 
Strategy); and
•  clearing invasive non-native species such as 
Rhododendron (clearance programmes have 
received targeted funding through the EU, 
Scottish Forestry Grants Scheme, Scottish Rural 
Development Programme and Scottish Natural 
Heritage (SNH) discretionary funds).
There is an increasing awareness that there is often 
the need to take a whole system approach.
For example, the need for landscape scale conservation 
(large-scale collaborative land management projects 
that aim to improve an area’s ecological health to 
benefit people and biodiversity), is recognised in 
the Scottish Government’s Land Use Strategy, and 
the Scottish Biodiversity and Forestry Strategies. A 
Landscape-Scale Conservation Working Group has 
been formed to enable greater collaboration and 
the sharing of good practice among stakeholders. 
Participating organisations include SNH, FCS, 
Scottish Government, Scottish Environment 
Protection Agency, Local Authorities, Scottish 
Wildlife Trust and RSPB Scotland. This type of 
“ Given the long-term nature of climate 
change adaptation, there is a danger that it 
will be all too easy to sideline as other policy 
areas relating to economic strength post-
Brexit take a more dominant position. ”
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partnership working and knowledge exchange, can 
help to build the overall resilience of whole sectors, and 
there are a growing number of examples:
•  The Climate Ready Forest Network (a partnership 
between FCS, Forest Research, ClimateXChange and 
private forest owners), aims to support the forest sector 
in Scotland to adapt to climate change;
•  Diffuse Pollution Management Action Group (a 
partnership which includes the National Farmers 
Union Scotland, Scottish Land and Estates, Scottish 
Water, FCS, and SNH) that helps to ensure effective 
delivery of River Basin Management Plan actions with 
input from a cross section of rural, environmental and 
biodiversity interests. 
The SCCAP contains a strong emphasis on the need 
to improve the overall knowledge base that is critical 
to enabling informed management and reducing 
potential maladaptation.
However, significant gaps in knowledge remain and these 
need to be filled to improve monitoring and evaluation 
of adaptation actions. The recent interim assessment of 
the SCCAP by the Adaptation Sub-Committee (of the 
Committee on Climate Change) has also highlighted 
the need to ensure that appropriate milestones and 
timescales are also set in order to ensure that the process 
is effectively managed. 
Anna Moss is a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the University of 
Dundee. She is the joint lead for the ClimateXChange Adaptation 
Indicators project which aims to capture the best available 
scientific knowledge to support and monitor Scottish Government 
adaptation policy and practice, and provide a knowledge base 
for all organisations working towards a climate resilient Scotland 
(a.z.moss@dundee.ac.uk).
DEVOLUTION AND ADAPTATION
The Scottish Government has been able to set out (and 
achieve) more ambitious targets for carbon reduction 
than the rest of the UK, and has shown a far greater 
commitment to renewable energy than the Westminster 
Government (with a target to deliver 100 per cent of 
electricity consumption from renewables by 2020).
Unique to administrations in the UK, Scotland has a 
coordinated Land Use Strategy which sets out principles 
and proposals for sustainable land use and accounts for 
changing suitability of the land due to climate change. 
This is critical for coherent management of natural 
resources and has the potential to limit maladaptation 
through competing demands.
Effective policy is built on the availability of the best 
knowledge delivered in an accessible and timely 
fashion. For this reason, the Scottish Government has 
established centres of expertise in areas of high policy 
importance to provide independent advice, research 
and analysis and it is generally accepted that this 
model is working very well. One of these centres, 
ClimateXChange, is focused specifically on adapting to 
the changing climate and the transition to a low carbon 
society. Monitoring climate change adaptation is a new 
area of policy and practice, and ClimateXChange has 
been working to establish baseline information and 
knowledge of existing trends with an extensive suite 
of indicators linked to both the CCRA and SCCAP, to 
help policy makers and others to understand how well 
Scotland is adapting to climate change and highlight 
where policy action may be needed to encourage and 
strengthen adaptation.
THE IMPACT OF BREXIT
The EU has played a crucial role in the provision 
of climate change related legislation, guidance and 
funding for adaptation, resilient infrastructure projects 
and research (e.g. the UK is set to receive €1.9 billion 
for climate change adaptation and risk prevention 
during the current EU budget 2014-20), and there is 
great uncertainty as to the extent that the Westminster 
Government will be willing to pick up this bill. The 
existing regulatory structures will need to be replaced or 
even strengthened, but many people working in this area 
have little faith that the current administration has that 
commitment. Merging the Department of Energy and 
Climate Change with the Department of Business, Energy 
and Industrial Strategy, sent a worrying message and 
cannot be seen as anything other than a de-prioritisation 
of climate change as a whole (and adaptation was already 
something of a 'poor cousin' to mitigation). Uncertainty 
over future European funding is already impacting 
research, as European consortiums are becoming 
nervous of being led by UK institutions or even of their 
inclusion at all.
Given the long-term nature of climate change 
adaptation, there is a danger that it will be all too easy 
to sideline as other policy areas relating to economic 
strength post-Brexit take a more dominant position. 
Climate change is a global issue, and dealing with the 
consequential risks (including global issues of food 
security and climate migration) and the need to adapt 
to them requires cross-border, regional coordination. 
Therefore, just as mitigation needs global solutions and 
agreements, so there will be an increasing need for 
international dialogue and cooperation to strengthen 
not only more fragile nations, but our own resilience 
also. Thankfully, the current Scottish Government are 
showing a desire to remain fully immersed in European 
and international dialogue and a determination to 
strengthen Scotland’s commitments with regard to 
mitigation. Hopefully this will also drive continued 
commitment to adaptation; the challenge will be with 
regard to the areas over which we have no control.
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Northern Ireland’s (NI) environment, economy and geographical location are unique within the UK. The region enjoys a variety of 
unique terrestrial, water and marine landscapes, 
and for its size, is one of the most geographically 
diverse areas of the planet (flowing from a complex 
geology and topography). The economic context 
differs from the rest of the UK due to a higher 
proportion of turnover gained through small to 
medium enterprises (between 14 per cent and 27 per 
cent more than elsewhere in the UK1). The region is 
also the only part of the UK to share a land border 
with another government. Alongside these unique 
characteristics, climate projections vary from the rest 
of the UK, following the north west/south east split 
across the British Isles largely dictated by the Atlantic 
signal. Plans to support the region in planning and 
preparing for climate change adaptation must therefore 
recognise and respond to these unique characteristics.
A CHANGE IN CLIMATE
NI has been getting warmer. The 2005-2014 decade was 
0.7 °C warmer than the 1961-1990 average, sea-level 
has risen by around 1.4 mm per year and extreme 
weather events have become more frequent. The Climate 
Northern Ireland (CNI) website has a graphic timeline2 
of these events, which illustrates the types of weather 
events experienced (including floods, wind damage and 
cold snaps) and their impact on society. 
The most recent projections suggest that NI is expected 
to continue getting warmer in summer and winter 
(mean summer temperature increase of between 
0.8 °C and 4 °C under a medium emissions scenario, 
Jane E McCullough and Stephen McCabe discuss the impact of national 
and regional climate change policy on the diverse geographical and 
economic situation of Northern Ireland.
Balancing national and 
regional involvement in 
climate change adaptation
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with more pronounced warming at night-time and 
inland1). Summer precipitation is expected to reduce by 
up to 41 per cent and winter precipitation to increase 
by 27 per cent by 21001. Storminess is likely to increase 
in winter and in late summer in response to increased 
convective activity1. 
Understanding of the climate change risks facing 
different aspects of society and the natural environment 
in NI varies. Commonly, where an impact is already 
being observed, a sense of urgency has led to research 
being undertaken in response to observed threats. 
However, regarding the many risks associated with 
climate change that are more complex and systemic 
in nature, the state of adaptation policy and action in 
NI may be more characterised by lack of information 
and evidence. 
The most blatant and urgent climate change risk facing 
NI is flooding from various sources; pluvial flooding, 
surface water flooding and sea-level rise. Serious local 
flooding events have been experienced each year since 
2007 and are expected to become more frequent in 
response to climate change. Lough Neagh in central 
NI is the largest freshwater body in the British Isles 
and is largely surrounded by agricultural land and 
rural settlements. In 2016, the three winter storms 
which hit the UK and Ireland in quick succession led 
to unprecedented rainfall and consequent flooding 
which impacted homes, farms, business and wildlife 
on the shoreline. Belfast city centre, which has been 
identified as a significant flood risk area by the Rivers 
Agency, has experienced several serious “near misses” 
in recent years, while surrounding residential areas were 
hit with flooding episodes. In response, a government 
programme of flooding research and planning has 
been developed, part of which delivered the Northern 
Ireland Flood Risk Maps3, as required by the EU Floods 
Directive. This work has found that currently in NI, 
1 in 18 properties are at risk of flooding4 , including 
46,000 homes 5. As indicated in Figure 1, flooding is a 
risk in both rural and urban areas. 
GOVERNANCE AND ADAPTATION PLANNING
Governance is guided by the UK Climate Act, UK the 
Climate Change Risk Assessment (CCRA) and the 
requirement for a devolved region adaptation plan. These 
require NI, as a devolved region, to submit evidence 
into the CCRA undertaken by the UK Government 
on a five yearly cycle. From this, the Climate Change 
Risk Assessment Evidence Report: Summary for Northern 
Ireland is developed. This gives NI, as a small region, 
the opportunity to benefit from the centralised expertise 
of the Committee on Climate Change. Yet for many 
issues, NI is unable to provide the evidence required to 
effectively undertake an assessment. There are two main 
barriers to evidence submission. First, many of the issues 
have not garnered local research attention or funding 
(or NI lacks the capacity to undertake the research) 
and, second, accessing or bringing together the existing 
research in a coordinated way can be challenging. 
However, in the recent CCRA evidence gathering 
exercise, CNI coordinated a more comprehensive 
submission of research from academia. 
“ As NI is situated within the 
UK and shares an island with 
the Republic of Ireland, 
climate change adaptation 
planning must negotiate 
and collaborate with both 
governance systems. ”
 Figure 1. Significant Flood Risk Area map. Provided by the Northern Ireland Rivers Agency.
Due to lack of cross-party support, and resistance from 
some sectors, NI is the only part of the UK not to have 
a Climate Change Act. There is broad recognition that 
our climate change is changing, and that there is a need 
to prepare and adapt to protect and enhance society. 
However, stakeholders have identified that political 
will and leadership will be a 'make or break' factor in 
the success of adaptation to climate change over coming 
years. As climate change risk assessments are undertaken 
for the UK as a whole, NI is on an important journey 
toward finding the optimum balance and engagement 
between UK and local resources, expertise and policy. 
Ultimately, this work also feeds into the development 
of the Northern Ireland Climate Change Adaptation 
Plan6 (produced by the then Department of Environment 
– now Department of Agriculture, Environment and 
Rural Affairs, DAERA). The existing plan takes a 
government-focused approach by identifying primary 
areas for action (covering flooding, water, natural 
environment, and agriculture and forestry) – an approach 
that is expected to change with the next iteration of the 
plan (due in 2018) toward taking a more integrated 
and outward looking perspective on challenges and 
potential solutions. 
Of course, the island of Ireland is one bio-geographical 
unit – the earth surface and atmosphere system has no 
regard for the border. As NI is situated within the UK 
and shares land border with the Republic of Ireland, 
climate change adaptation planning must negotiate 
and collaborate with both governance systems. Close 
working with other UK regions and cross-border working 
with the Republic of Ireland is essential for climate 
change adaptation planning and will be necessary for 
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successful implementation. Official structures include 
the North-South Ministerial Council, intended to foster 
collaborative working on environment, where common 
policies and approaches can be agreed. The need for 
cross-border working on climate change adaptation 
will become even more important as Brexit progresses, 
with uncertainty around environmental regulation, 
currently taking cues from EU Directives (which will 
still be in place in the Republic of Ireland). Cross border 
working will thus have to negotiate both cross country 
regulation, but also EU and non-EU regulation. Ireland's 
National Climate Action and Low Carbon Development 
Bill provides the national policy context for a strategic 
national adaptation response to climate change which 
aims to achieve a transition to a competitive, low carbon, 
climate resilient and environmentally sustainable 
economy by 2050 – a policy landscape with which NI 
will have to interact, and complement. 
PROMOTING ADAPTATION THROUGH PARTNERSHIP
Climate Northern Ireland (CNI) was set up to increase 
understanding of the impacts of climate change in NI 
and promote action to address climate change across 
all sectors of society by:
•  providing information;
•  supporting forums;
•  promoting action; and
•  supporting policy development.
The difficulty of providing evidence to the UK CCRA was 
highlighted above, and CNI seeks to provide solutions 
to those NI barriers through promoting awareness of 
research gaps, and also working strategically to bring 
existing knowledge together for the benefit of policy 
makers. CNI is currently developing a new institutional 
structure to support partnership working (Figure 2).
This broad structure aims to support a partnership 
approach to sector based awareness raising and policy 
development. As the impacts of climate change are 
specific to the vulnerabilities of a region and therefore 
often require a place based approach, CNI plans to use 
these groups as a network and expertise resource for 
such work. To raise awareness of the climate change 
expertise available, CNI has developed an online 
knowledge directory featuring people with expertise 
in climate change relevant to NI. 
This partnership structure was used by CNI in 
development of the “Planning for Climate Change: 
Stakeholder Engagement Report (2015)”7. Four sectoral 
workshops were carried out in June 2015 in collaboration 
with leading sectoral organisations (the Institution 
of Civil Engineers, Business in the Community and 
Northern Ireland Environment Link). The sectors 
addressed were “Infrastructure”, “Business and  Figure 2. Climate Northern Ireland Partnership Structure
“ Due to lack of cross-party 
support, and resistance from 
some sectors, NI is the only 
part of the UK not to have a 
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Industry”, “Natural Environment and Rural Economy” and 
the “People and Built Environment sectors”. The objectives 
of the workshops were to: 
•  Identify and prioritise the climate risks facing NI; 
•  Evaluate the reach and risks addressed by the current 
Northern Ireland Climate Change Adaptation (NICCAP) 
Programme 2014-2019; and
•  Evaluate current climate change adaptationand knowledge. 
The report flowing from these workshops, and finalised 
by the CNI Steering Group, has been used to:
•  Identify gaps in scientific evidence about climate 
risks facing NI. CNI will share the gaps in evidence 
with relevant research communities to encourage 
evidence gathering;
•  Identify common risks and proposed actions across 
different sectors. CNI will use its network to try and 
bring together stakeholders concerned about similar 
issues with the aim of supporting action; 
•  Develop a strategy to support awareness raising and 
adaptation action where required; 
•  Inform the UK Adaptation Sub-Committee for 
consideration in the Climate Change Risk Assessment 
for Northern Ireland 2017; and
•  Support DAERA in evaluating the aims and reach 
of the current Northern Ireland Climate Change 
Adaptation programme (2014-2019). 
The structure also aims to facilitate stakeholders to bring 
adaptation issues to the attention of the wider network 
and to propose action. For example, the infrastructure 
group has recently highlighted the need to bring key 
people together to forward the uptake of Sustainable 
Urban Drainage Systems (SuDS) in NI. This group, with 
support of CNI, organised an event to bring together 
policy makers, designers, developers and environmental 
NGOs to discuss the risks, opportunities, enablers 
and blockers to the uptake of SuDS with the aim of 
developing a roadmap which all stakeholders support.
In response to cross border complexities and the need 
for closer partnership working, CNI, along with Climate 
Ireland, is working towards the establishment of an 
All Ireland Climate Change Adaptation Network to 
improve collaboration on a more holistic approach to 
improving resilience. This will include extension of the 
n-line knowledge directory to all of the island. 
CONCLUSIONS
The complexity of designing a coherent response 
to climate change demands genuine partnership 
working across sectors and borders. So far this has 
been piecemeal, but we are hopeful for a more strategic, 
outward, collaborative approach going forward in NI. 
CNI will be crucial to such an approach. The challenge 
remains to reach local communities with the adaptation 
and resilience message, promoting locally relevant 
and effective responses to the impacts that are seen 
on the ground. 
Jane E McCullough coordinates the Climate Northern Ireland 
programme, which aims to support Northern Ireland in becoming 
resilient to the impacts of climate change through awareness 
raising, partnership working and evidence gathering for policy 
development. Jane studied architecture, is an Associate Member 
of the Royal Society of British Architects, spent several years as 
an architectural researcher at Queen’s University Belfast and is 
still involved in architectural practice. She has a particular interest 
in climate change mitigation and adaptation in buildings and the 
wider built environment. 
Dr Stephen McCabe works for Northern Ireland Environment 
Link. Stephen is an environmental geomorphologist with a strong 
background in heritage science and physical geography. He has 
managed government–funded research projects with important 
policy implications, including several projects investigating the 
complex impacts of climate change on stone–built heritage. 
He acts as a peer reviewer for a wide range of international 
environmental science journals. Stephen is a Chartered 
Geographer, an elected Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society, 
a member of the British Society for Geomorphology, and a Visiting 
Research Fellow at Queen’s University Belfast.
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Climate change and sustainable development have been major policy challenges for a number of countries in Europe. Since the late 1990s in Wales, 
climate change policy has been driven by the Welsh 
Government which, under the Government of Wales 
Act 1998, created a devolved legislative body and a new 
organisation to promote sustainable development in all 
of its work. So whereas for many levels of government 
sustainable development is an aspirational goal, in 
Wales it is a legal duty that is to be delivered by the 
Welsh Government.  Devolution and a commitment to 
sustainable development has provided the framework 
through which climate change adaptation thinking has 
taken place. 
Delivery of a novel policy issue, like climate change 
adaptation, has proved to be problematic. The 
onus has been on the Welsh Government to develop its 
own capacity to think through how it should mainstream 
novel policy issues and promote them with its partners 
(e.g. local government). In doing so, the emphasis for the 
Welsh Government has been on an inclusive process of 
preparing and maintaining policy. In this paper, it will 
be outlined how forms of governance are changing, how 
climate change adaptation policy is being developed, 
and the challenges that the Welsh Government faces in 
moving from policy rhetoric to delivery.
CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY IN WALES
Climate change policy in Wales has developed rapidly 
over recent years, driven by the UK Government Climate 
Change Act 2008. There is a political commitment to 
a 3 per cent annual emissions reduction in areas of 
devolved responsibility. This has been reinforced in a 
Climate change  
adaptation in Wales:  
Much ado about nothing?
Andrew Flynn, Andrew Kythreotis and Alan Netherwood outline the 
challenges that the Welsh Government face in moving from climate 
change and sustainable development policy rhetoric to delivery.
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seen to open a window of opportunity in Wales, and 
one that was widened by:
•  The UK Climate Impacts Programme (UKCIP) – Their 
data provided Welsh specific information on climate 
change, thus establishing an evidence base;
•  A series of Welsh Climate Change Risk Assessments – 
This looked in detail at how assets and services could 
be affected by climate change5,6 ;
•  A Welsh Local Government Association, Changing 
Climate Changing Places – A pilot project funded by 
the Welsh Government to inform the approach to 
adaptation within local government in Wales. This 
involved four councils: Cardiff, Flintshire, Gwynedd 
and Rhondda Cynon Taff, with the help of UKCIP, 
Environment Agency Wales, Countryside Council for 
Wales (now both part of Natural Resources Wales and 
Welsh Government); and
•  The Climate Change Commission for Wales.
Below, the delivery of climate change adaptation 
policy, which has been patchy despite these favourable 
conditions, is explored.
GOVERNANCE FOR POLICY MAKING AND DELIVERY
Within Wales, as a consequence of devolution, the 
traditional form of governance based on hierarchies 
that typify British government are, to some extent, being 
subverted by a commitment to a more partnership based 
approach. Table 1 illustrates the key features of coercive 
and partnership based models of governance.
 Table 1. Delivering policy in Wales: ideal models of governance
FEATURE COERCIVE PARTNERSHIP
Targets Set from centre, prescriptive Agreed by consent
Means to achieve goals
Hold to account and audit, rule 
bound relationships
Educate and spread knowledge
Agendas
Likely to be different agendas held 
by different actors
Seek shared agenda
Policy entrepreneurialism Authoritative figure Network, discursive
Lower level autonomy Minimise local discretion
Accept local discretion and 
autonomy
Knowledge
Concentrated at the centre and 
to be dispersed from the centre 
outwards
Knowledge diffused and seek 
means to utilise local knowledge
Openness Limited and to favoured few Consultative and participatory
Views of lower tier of 
government/public bodies
Hierarchy Partner in policy delivery
Funding Ring fence budgets
Budgets determined according to 
local priorities within a common 
agenda
Policy outcomes
Seek uniformity around a baseline 
because monitoring for compliance 
with targets
Accept variability above baseline 
because seeking improvements in 
practice and spreading knowledge
strong policy framework for mitigation1 via the Welsh 
Government’s Climate Change Strategy of 2010, and 
subsequent Delivery Plans and Reports2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, overseen 
by the Climate Change Commission for Wales (CCCW), 
established in 2007. However this focus on climate change 
by the Welsh Government has not been translated into 
the performance frameworks at a local government level, 
among the 22 unitary authorities and three National 
Parks. The policy framework for climate mitigation is 
relatively strong in Wales, whereas that for adaptation is 
weak. The adaptation reporting requirements of public 
bodies contained within the Climate Change Act 2008, 
have been interpreted by the Welsh Government as 
voluntary rather than mandatory. Additionally, there is 
no statutory requirement for the Welsh Government to 
prepare a “National Adaptation Plan” in response to the 
findings of the UK Climate Change Risk Assessment 
Evidence Report 2012.
The picture that emerges is one in which climate change 
is a major policy issue. 
There is action – through legislation at the UK 
government level – but a hesitant response within 
Wales. The pressing nature of climate change and 
the Climate Change Act 2008 should have helped 
nurture conditions that were ripe for significant policy 
development in Wales. Indeed, the Act might have been 
Applying this model to the experience of climate 
adaptation in Wales is informative, as it reveals 
how complex policy making and delivery can be in 
practice. At a national level, climate change adaptation 
policy development has generally been coercive and 
a response to external stimuli such as, the Climate 
Change Act. The Welsh Government has set out its 
own responsibilities, activities, funding and targets, but 
been more reluctant to extend these to other actors. This 
highlights the limitations of partnership working in 
which both the Welsh Government and its partners have 
limited capacity. The result is voluntary and uneven 
local policy delivery.
Much of the climate change adaptation activity at a 
local level has been partnership based, exhibiting key 
features listed in Table 1, and often independent of 
the Welsh Government and its strategic vision. This 
approach is illustrated by a small number of partnerships 
in local government progressing adaptation planning 
in spite of the weakness of governance structure: 
Flintshire, Carmarthenshire, Torfaen and Caerphilly 
have all completed risk assessments, collected local 
data, focused on shared risks and developed adaptation 
plans with local service partners focusing on essential 
infrastructure, asset management and in the latter case, 
rural economies. The dominant debates though in the 
public sector are how key policy actors should tackle 
austerity and public sector reform, and these have taken 
precedence in most authorities.
Since 2008, although climate change has had a high 
policy profile, it has rarely demanded action from key 
actors concerned with adaptation (e.g. local government). 
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For instance, the Welsh Government provided no 
statutory guidance to require change, only voluntary 
policy guidance on assessing risk and preparing action 
plans. Revealingly, annual reporting on climate change 
activities has been undertaken via the CCCW, a loose 
coalition of public bodies, agencies and academics, 
which has overseen Welsh Government work on 
climate change. There is a clear disconnect between 
the aims of the national 2010 Climate Change Strategy 
and the willingness of local actors to get involved in 
implementing it. A growing frustration at the pace 
and breadth of change on climate change adaptation is 
now leading to suggestions that a more coercive style 
of governance should be promoted that could introduce 
statutory guidance on climate adaptation. For example, 
the national 2010 Climate Change Strategy included a 
commitment to produce five ”Sectoral Adaptation Plans” 
(SAPs), which were widely regarded as the equivalent 
of a Welsh Government ”National Adaptation Plan”, 
similar to that implemented by DEFRA in England. 
But the failure to make real practical progress on any 
of these (with the exception of still unpublished work 
on the Natural Environment SAP) is therefore all 
the more concerning – and a reflection of the Welsh 
Government’s apparent lack of priority to adaptation. 
Lack of progress on developing the SAPs led to the 
CCCW Adaptation Subgroup feeling compelled to step 
into this policy void to capture non-state views and 
potential actions in relation to three SAPs: Business 
and Tourism, Communities, and Infrastructure. The 
willingness of individuals to give their time and thought 
to this is significant from a partnership point of view.
Indeed, the lack of a coherent and ambitious approach 
to climate change adaptation is certainly not caused by 
the lack of science, data or evidence, or the willingness 
of non-state adaptation actors to work with the Welsh 
Government. Although this is part of the Welsh 
Government’s framing of the issue, it is rather by:
•  a lack of statutory guidance from the Climate Change 
Act 2008 which has allowed policy to drift;
•  an austerity agenda that has focused decision makers’ 
attention on the cost of services;
•  competing public service agendas (health) with 
well-established and well organised advocacy groups;
•  reduced capacity in governmental policy units to 
undertake independent thinking and analysis, 
highlighting the weak capacity of government 
in Wales;
•  public service reform in which attention is focused 
on issues of scale and service delivery for traditional 
government activities and in which climate change 
adaptation is marginalised; and
•  a Climate Change Commission for Wales that has 
limited powers and authority.
These are significant challenges. In the section below, it 
is addressed as to whether or not they might be tackled 
in the near future.
THE WELL-BEING OF FUTURE GENERATIONS ACT 2015
At a national level, climate change adaptation has now 
been reworked into a new policy concept based on 
inclusion in statutory “Well-being Goals” in the Well- 
being of Future Generations Act (Wales) 2015; the Welsh 
Government’s flagship legislation. This legislation has 
led to the cessation of the CCCW which has provided 
important partnership advice to the Welsh Government 
as an impartial, critical friend. The new Act places a 
statutory duty on 44 public bodies in Wales to: 
•  adopt the Sustainable Development Principle (that 
decisions need to demonstrate how they have applied 
long term, preventative, integrated, collaborative 
approaches involving key stakeholders);
•  work towards seven national Well-being Goals; 
•  focus their work on Future Generations (as well 
as current);
•  contribute to the work of statutory Public Service 
Boards (PSBs); 
•  take a central role in the development of a Well-being 
Plan based on a long term assessment of the state of 
communities and ”place” aligned to local authority areas;
•  respond to a new accountability framework including 
reporting and review by the Auditor General Wales 
for the National Assembly with advice from a Future 
Generations Commissioner.
Of the seven national Well-being Goals, two refer 
specifically to climate adaptation:
“A Resilient Wales: A nation which maintains and enhances 
a biodiverse natural environment with healthy functioning 
ecosystems that support social, economic and ecological resilience 
and the capacity to adapt to change (for example climate change).
“ There is a clear disconnect between the 
aims of the national 2010 Climate Change 
Strategy and the willingness of local actors 
to get involved in implementing it.”
© Jenny Thompson | Fotolia
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A Prosperous Wales is: An innovative, productive and 
low carbon society which recognises the limits of the global 
environment and therefore uses resources efficiently and 
proportionately (including acting on climate change)”.
This is a significant reworking of how climate change 
adaptation was framed in the 2000s. It remains to be 
seen whether this new statutory footing and policy 
context results in profile and action around climate 
adaptation planning. How will the new accountability 
framework and performance framework around the 
Act compel or persuade public bodies to take climate 
adaptation seriously? The accountability framework for 
the Act has a number of features including: the Wales 
Audit Office (WAO) undertaking reviews of public 
bodies and how they have meet goals and principles; 
and reviews of PSBs’ Well-being Plans by a recently 
appointed new Future Generations Commissioner. The 
Commissioner will have particular powers to ensure 
that PSBs have inter alia, set well-being objectives that 
are in accordance with the sustainable development 
principle, and take account of the “long-term” impacts 
of PSBs. While aspects of the accountability framework 
are still to be fully developed, it will be down to the 
WAO and the Commissioner to drive action on this 
agenda. In the interim, there is a concern for climate 
planning and governance more generally (mitigation 
and adaptation) with the handover of CCCW’s role to the 
Future Generations Commissioner. The Commissioner’s 
focus is primarily on the Public Sector, whereas 
CCCW had representatives from all sectors. How does 
society regain the cross-sector, cross-party forum and 
partnership working that CCCW has provided as 
an impartial institution since 2007? This represents 
an important issue for mainstreaming sustainable 
development; the principle that underpins the new Act. 
A new national set of indicators have also been published 
to tie in with the Act, an early “litmus test” of how 
climate adaptation is communicated and monitored 
at a national level. The sole link to climate adaptation 
is a measure of the “Number of properties (homes 
and businesses) at medium and high risk of flooding 
from rivers and the sea”10. The narrow preoccupation 
with adaptation as “flooding”, is revealing of how the 
topic is being currently conceptualised by the Welsh 
Government. This, in turn, is likely to frame how 
Well-Being Assessments and Plans are framed at a 
local level.
A broader and more ambitious agenda for climate 
adaptation in Wales will also need to address:
•  a stronger role for the Climate Change Commission 
Wales to act as part of an advocacy coalition 
and develop a more sympathetic environment for 
policy debate;
•  building capacity in the public sector for officers, 
agencies and key actors so that they can undertake 
independent, well-resourced analysis and have the 
arenas in which to discuss their ideas;
•  guidance to give substance to the Future Generations 
Act which needs to focus on the institutionalisation 
of innovation; and
•  local narratives and scenarios of climate change 
adaptation need to be further developed to 
communicate to communities the changes they 
may experience.
CONCLUSIONS
The Welsh Government has limited capacity for 
independent policy development. It has made a virtue 
out of partnership working, partly as a means to 
extend its capacity by engaging with knowledge and 
communities that it would not previously have accessed. 
As a form of governance, partnerships have important 
implications for the way in which policy can develop. 
Partnerships can knit together diverse groups (e.g. 
local government and public bodies) and work between 
different levels of government. By doing so, partnerships 
can rework ideas and concepts and make them real and 
resonant to decision makers. However, there is a caveat 
to partnership working for adaptation. Recent research 
has found that adaptation is giving way to a resilience 
discourse by subnational governance and policy actors 
in the UK, including Wales. The “resilience trap” is 
represented by the dangers of adopting short-term 
strategies as a reaction to climate impacts like flooding, 
rebadging existing adaptation strategies and widening 
partnership networks, which obfuscate subnational 
mobilisation around adaptation by favouring economic 
resilience over climate resilience11.
Consequently, we need to be sensitive to the ways 
in which governance arrangements like partnership 
working can facilitate or constrain opportunities for 
policy rhetoric and delivery. The limited policy content 
on climate change adaptation (as compared to mitigation) 
in Wales has meant that its operationalisation has been 
narrow, for example, at the local level little has gone 
on beyond risk assessment. Climate change adaptation 
has been simply outcompeted by other policy issues. 
Our contention is that, despite favourable conditions 
for climate adaptation to be applied across the policy 
spectrum, without specific accountability and drivers, 
and the right sort of partners, it may once again, be 
marginalised by other more short-term, urgent issues.
© Rixie | Adobe Stock
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New members and re-grades
Jonas Beaugas – Consultant
Thomas Benson – Contaminated Land Officer
James Browne – Graduate Air Quality Consultant
Julia Burnell – Graduate Air Quality Consultant
Jennifer Chambers – Graduate Environmental Scientist
Jake Cole – Water Treatment Graduate Sales Engineer
Joanne Copping – Laboratory Technician II
Andrew Davies – Graduate 
Patrick Donnelly – Senior Project Officer (ZEN)
Iain Dunbar-Marchant – Independent Consultant
Lauren Elvidge – Senior Environmental Scientist
Sarah Errity  – Graduate
John Harrington – Graduate Air Quality Consultant
Rebecca Heaton – Graduate 
Freya Herman – Funding & Relationships Officer
Nicole Holland – Assistant Air Quality Consultant
Sally Howse – Assistant Environmental Consultant
Khadija Jabeen – Postgraduate Researcher (Environmental Research Group)
Matthew Jones – Graduate 
Alex Jones – Air Quality Consultant
Samuel Kesson – Environment & Safety Officer
Felicity Lowther – Graduate Environmental Consultant
Matthew McBride – Environmental Technician
Musashi Morley – Trade Waste & Pollution Control Officer
Mark Murphy – Environmental Assessment Graduate
Darryl Neylon – Assistant Geo-environmental Engineer
Katherine Petty – Graduate Environmental Consultant
Stuart Powles – Environmental Officer
Ronit Prawer – Science & Innovation Officer
Muhammad Rajput – Graduate Air Quality Consultant
Craig Rattigan – Graduate 
Josh Rollason – Graduate
Adam Romo – Graduate
Samantha Sage – Part time Customer Assistant
James Southwood – Researcher (Freelance)
Shannon Stone – Permitting Officer (Water Resources & Waste)
James Thornton – Environmental Advisor
Udeme Umoren – Chemistry Lecturer
Claire Varney – Graduate
Alexandra von Hoyningen-Huene – Graduate
George Walker – Graduate 
Joss Watson – Environmental Consultant
Jana Wedell – Environmental Consultant
Harry West – GIS Tutor and Postgraduate Researcher
Courtenay Williams – Graduate 
Dirk Wilyman – Environmental Consultant 
Kate Buchanan – Student
Matthew Freeman – Student
Andrew Gorton – Student
Rosemary Hunt – Student
Andrew Kane – Portfolio Manager Construction & Environmental
Sudiksha Kaushik – Student
Gauravi Kaushik – Student
Gillian Maycock – Customer Assistant
Hugo Milner – Student
Marios Panagi – Student
Laura Parry – Zero Emissions Network Officer
Sophie Power – CEO
Rosemary  Teixeira – Graduate 
Simon Bingham – Development Unit Manager 
Joanne Kwan – Project Manager
John Midgley – Principal Scientist
Adrian Punt – Managing Director
Jenna Angliss – Graduate 
Elizabeth Beers – Associate (Team Leader - Contaminated Land)
Oliver Belson – Principal Environmental Consultant
Nadia Bidzinska – Environmental Advisor
Kirk Bridgewood – Technical Director
Sam Chapman – Chief Innovation Officer, Director & Co-Founder
Steven Cone – Senior Hydrogeologist & Senior Groundwater Modeller
Nicholas Daniels – Contracts Manager
Gareth Davies – Technologist - Special Analysis
Anthony Dixon – Environmental Consultant
Neil Fyfe – Associate
Nicholas Gardner – Scientist
Emma Gibbons – Senior Air Quality Consultant
Alec Hales – Senior Contaminated Land Consultant
Steven Harding – Senior Environmental Consultant
Stephen Jay – Graduate Acoustic Consultant
Chi Chung Li – General Manager (Safety & Environmental Protection)
Mansour Malik – Environment, Health & Safety Specialist
Patrice McVeigh – Senior Sustainability Engineer
Kathryn Monk – Principal Advisor for Science
Dana Montgomery – Environmental Scientist
Denise Onwumere – Administrative Assistant (Environment)
Damian Pawson – Acting Divisional Manager (Environment)
Nichola Rafferty – Senior Environmental Consultant
Jacqueline Rogers –  Associate Dean, Learning, Teaching & Student Experience
Hallan Sambrooke – Technical Assistant
Edmond Sanganyado – Graduate
Jo-Anne Sewlal – Lecturer in Ecology and Evolutionary Biology
Jonathan Shaw – Principal Engineer
Amit Singh – Humanitarian Preparedness Coordinator
Katie Smart – Sustainability Assessor
Piercarlo Smith – Senior Environmental Scientist
Jacob Surman – Environmental Specialist
Katy Tsesmelis – Manager - (Mining & Refining)
Nigel Turner – Project Engineer (Environmental & Geotechnical)
Anthony Vine – Technical Manager
Simon Waite – Associate
Alison Williams – Associate Director
Timothy Williamson – Principal Consultant
Lu Yang – Sustainability & Environmental Consultant 
Cristiano Ascolani – Contaminated Land Consultant
Samuel Barker – Graduate 
Matthew Bayliss – Masters Student
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The changing face  
of the Northern Ireland 
planning system:  
An environmental perspective
Joseph Martin analyses the challenges and achievements Northern 
Ireland has faced in environmental planning policy and looks at what 
the future may hold.
The Planning system in Northern Ireland (NI) has undergone a rapid period of transition in the last few years, attributed to the reformation of the local 
councils and the new power of planning decision makers. 
In April 2015, the Strategic Planning Policy Statement 
(SPPS)1 for NI was published which effectively, in the 
Department for Infrastructure’s (DfI) words, reduced 
over 800 pages of policy down to less than 100 pages. 
This was a significant achievement considering the 
problems of planning which have curtailed development 
planning in NI for decades. In essence, the SPPS replaces 
around twenty Planning Policy Statements (PPS) into 
one composite policy document. This is a significant 
change to the number and role of previous planning 
policies in NI.
This article will look at some of the challenges and 
opportunities that the planning system in NI now faces. 
To look forward, one must sometimes look back and 
evaluate the planning system before the new “Super 
Councils” were introduced. This will allow a balanced 
perspective on planning policy in NI to be reached. 
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The previous planning system in NI was fundamentally 
centralised, with forward planning and development 
management functions undertaken by the Planning 
Service, an agency of the previous Department of the 
Environment (DOE) (now Department of Infrastructure 
(DfI)), which also set out its policy in the form of PPSs.
One of the many drawbacks of the old planning system 
was the length of time for planning applications to be 
decided upon. 
In 2013, the Planning Reform Bill which was designed to 
guide the path forward for council-led planning post-2015, 
was effectively scrapped. Other problems persisted such as, 
out of date local Area Plans still being used for planning 
application decisions and the need for greater policy to 
cope with the increasing number of renewable energy 
applications clogging the NI planning machine from 
effectively functioning properly. A lack of progress on Area 
Plans meant policies which were devised for a previous 
era were being used to inform current planning decisions. 
Most of the Area Plans were based on regional planning 
© spumador | Fotolia
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policy rather than specific localities which in itself 
was an inherent weakness. The Area Plans were also 
overcomplicated and voluminous with little public 
engagement on how they were formed. These issues 
were causing frustration among the wider public as 
well as key stakeholders within the province. 
Renewable energy planning applications were also on 
the rise (both small and large scale). The old planning 
system was feeling the strain due to a significant shift 
in the volume, timescale and approval of all these new 
applications made. As can be seen in Figure 1, spikes 
of renewable energy applications made and received 
occurred from 2009 onwards. 
In essence, the strain put on the NI Planning Department 
(now DfI) was immense as it had to facilitate these 
new increased applications as well as the normal levels 
of applications that were being submitted on a 
continual basis.
Other factors which were leading up to a much 
needed reform in local government planning policy 
were concerns around a lack of local council led 
involvement in planning application decisions and 
a lack of community led decision making within the 
of these councils will now be expected to produce their 
own Local Development Plan (LDP). These LDPs will 
take account of the Regional Development Strategy 2035 
(the sustainable development strategy for NI) to help 
designate and conserve i.e. Conservation Areas and 
Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB’s). As well 
as this, LDPs will have to take the lead on community 
planning to involve statutory bodies and community 
groups to address issues such as local tourism 
and urban/rural regeneration schemes, and visions 
to parallel with regional policy initiatives. Perhaps 
the greatest challenge though will be involving local 
groups and key stakeholders to actively contribute their 
own ideas and to formulate working groups within 
each community.
THE CASE FOR COMMUNITY PLANNING
The new planning restructuring within NI has pivoted 
on a theme which is prevalent in other devolved 
administrations within the England, Scotland and 
Wales community planning system. The new Area 
Plans, which are currently being prepared in the 11 
new Super Councils, will reflect the need to empower 
community leaders and community groups to submit 
their influence on the planning process. Research in 
wind farm developments throughout Europe suggest 
that the earlier communities become involved in 
exerting their influence in decision making processes, 
the more likely a positive outcome will be reached.
This will certainly be the case for the new era of 
planning in NI – the community cohesiveness in making 
these decisions will ensure collective responsibility is 
taken from now on. Further down the line, if problems 
arise, they can easily be rectified by each council area 
seeking constructive and positive consultation, instead 
of delivering an oblique solidary decision that must 
be appealed through a long stagnant process. The 
new era of planning reform in NI will only benefit 
from a structured, open and collaborative approach 
to community planning. From an environmental 
perspective, local knowledge will be crucial in driving 
local environmental policy that will strengthen and 
contribute to existing environmental designations 
within each council area. 
planning process. A change was in order and that is 
exactly what occurred in 2015.
THE WAY FORWARD REALISED
In April 2015, Planning Policy in NI changed forever 
when the SPPS was published, streamlining the 
previous system into a simpler, reliable and efficient 
planning model.
The move to a two tier model was realised:
(1)  The Dfl still retains powers for regional planning 
policy, the determination of regionally significant 
planning applications, and oversight and guidance 
for councils and governance structure in NI; and
(2)  Local councils have primary responsibility for 
the implementation of the following key planning 
functions:
      
•   local plan-making;
     •   development management; and
     •   planning enforcement.
Many of the previous council areas have now been 
reduced from a total of 26 to 11 Super Councils. Each 
 Figure 1. Renewable Energy Applications 2002/2003 – 2015/2016 in Northern Ireland. Reproduced from Department 
for Infrastructure and Investment 2. 













 Figure 2. Rathlin Island, part of the Antrim Coast and Glens Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty. (© PHB.cz | Fotolia)
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 Figure 3. Approved Wind Farm Applications in Northern Ireland in 2015/2016. Source: Department for  
Infrastructure, 20162.
LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS
As the new Super Councils develop and emerge with 
their own ideas on planning, the need to secure and 
strengthen local environmental planning policy and 
local conservation areas becomes critical. The strategic 
arm of decision making was the pillar of environmental 
policy for NI and it will still have great influence, 
but now too will local councils and decision makers. 
There will essentially be a greater role for those in the 
new council areas to have a greater environmental 
knowledge. Communities will be able to make informed 
decisions based on strategic environmental policy and 
local knowledge that will enable the correct decisions 
for that local area to be made.
In 2015, the Northern Ireland Renewables Industry 
Group (NIRG) made the following statement:
“In 2015, Northern Ireland faces a crucial phase of our 
journey towards sustainability. The key framework for 
sustainable energy in Northern Ireland, the Strategic Energy 
Framework, will be reviewed as it reaches its mid-way point. 
Our planning system will see profound changes as new 
Councils take responsibility for plan-making and planning 
decisions under a new policy framework”3.
WIND FARMS IN THE WEST OF NORTHERN IRELAND
The west of NI has one of the greatest wind resources 
in Europe. The rural counties of Fermanagh and 
Tyrone have seen an unprecedented number of 
planning applications for wind farms in the past 5 to 
10 years. In 2013, in a briefing to the Stormont Assembly 
Government, concerns were raised that the majority of 
wind farm applications were being made in the one 
area – the west of the province. These concerns were 
quickly raised by locals as the number of wind farms 
began to increase at a rate not seen in any other area of 
the UK. Local action groups were formed and negative 
feeling was beginning to assert itself to the previously 
unassailable wind energy industry within NI. 
The new Super Councils have so far shown that they 
are prepared to take some difficult decisions with 
regard to meeting regional and EU renewable targets, 
but at the same time protecting local environmental 
concerns, where appropriate. A balancing act is being 
made which meets approval from a strategic and local 
perspective. In the last year, wind farm applications 
are being rejected more often than in previous years. 
Recent examples include Dooish, Glenhordial and 
Slatbeg Wind Farms in County Tyrone (all rejected in 
2015) and Gortgall Wind Farm in County Fermanagh 
(rejected in 2016). It is clear in 2016 that the move to local 
decision making is having an effect on the renewables 
industry in NI. Are the perceptions on renewables in 
NI changing or is the revised planning system which 
has created a change in attitudes? As can be seen in 
Figure 1, the number of wind energy applications 
decided upon is now above the number of applications 
received within the same period of time. This is perhaps 
another indicator of positive change occurring within 
the revised planning system.
Figure 3 shows the proportion of wind turbine (both 
single and wind farm) applications approved in the 
2015/2016 period. It also shows that perhaps a more 
even proportion of wind energy applications are being 
approved across the province rather than solely in the 
west of the province, where wind energy prevails and 
has done since the first wind farm was erected in 1994 
at Bessy Bell Mountain. Will this change in the next 
five years? Will strategic energy policy overpower local 
planning with respect to large wind farms in the future?
NI'S FIRST MAJOR ENERGY FROM WASTE FACILITY
In 2014, NI’s first major energy from waste facility 
was given planning permission. The application was 
considered regionally significant under Article 21 
and the planning decision was therefore made by the 
Department. It was a significant decision, as it opened 
up a new sector of the economy which was previously 
struggling to get off the ground. It was a decision which 
showed that the planning system in the province was 
embracing change in the form of new technologies 
whilst also drawing on its strengths and experiences 
of the past.
The site, adjacent to the Bombardier wing facility within 
the Belfast Harbour Estate, will convert 120,000 tonnes 
per annum of Refuse Derived Fuel (RDF), taken from 
non-recyclable fractions of commercial and industrial 
(C&I) waste, into electricity and heat. The waste is 
incinerated through a gasification process which 
produces a synthetic gas fuel as a by-product; this is used 
to produce steam which in turn creates electricity4. It is 
anticipated that the facility will produce approximately 
100,000 MW of power each year5. The majority of the 
power will be used by the facility with spillage onto the 
grid if required5. No planning objections were received 
for the proposed scheme and its approval was seen as 
a generally positive and progressive step for the waste 
energy industry in the province. 
This was planning decision making as its most forward 
thinking, combining energy requirements, economic 
growth and diversification of the NI energy sector into 
a new area of growth. In total, it is projected at least 150 
jobs will be created by the proposed energy from waste 
facility when it is fully constructed in 2017. 
 Figure 4. A small wind turbine in Ballycastle, County Antrim, Northern Ireland. (© tina7si | Fotolia)
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THE HIGHTOWN WASTE INCINERATOR 
In September 2015, a key planning decision was made 
(since the introduction of the new planning powers 
in NI) which rejected the planning application for the 
Hightown Waste Incinerator at a former quarry site on 
the outskirts of Belfast6. The planning application had 
a significant number of objections and was submitted 
by Arc 21 (Arc 21 works on behalf of its member 
councils to guide, support and help them meet their 
legal requirements and drive forward innovative waste 
management programmes). The planning application 
was considered regionally significant and thus was 
decided upon by the Strategic Planning Division of the 
Department of Infrastructure.
The Department of Infrastructure's decision to reject 
the application was based upon various concerns raised 
by objectors which included the potential impact on 
the environment and the knock on effect for recycling 
within the area. An appeal of this decision is currently 
on-going as of September 2016. 
The process of this planning application is perhaps 
a precursor of how future planning applications in 
NI could be decided upon. The involvement of local 
opinions, community stakeholders, local politicians 
and community groups were key to informing the 
decision which was reached for this application. In the 
future, will planning applications, even those which 
are deemed 'strategic', involve more local council 
considerations and if so, at what level? 
 Figure 5. What are the key drivers for a stronger NI planning system post 2016?
PROGRESSIVE PLANNING IN COUNTY TYRONE
The Strule Shared Education Campus in Omagh is 
one such example which has combined the needs and 
requirements of the local community in County Tyrone 
with that of the local educational authority and the 
surrounding environment. The proposed scheme will 
result in several schools in the local area moving to a 
state of the art shared campus facility with cycleways 
and walkways incorporated into the design. The land 
had previously been occupied by a now defunct army 
barracks and the integrated approach to planning has 
resulted in one of the finest examples of progressive 
planning in the province. This pioneering approach 
to education will enable a 21st century curriculum to 
develop in progressive, modern and flexible facilities, 
aspects of which will be enhanced significantly through 
sharing resources. The pace of the development is 
continuing as of October 2016, but one school (Arvalee 
School and Resource Centre) has already opened. As 
well as providing much needed educational shared 
space, the transformation of the former army barracks 
is seen is another step towards a normalised society 
developing in NI. 
CONCLUSION
As the NI planning system moves forward from the 
reform of 2015, it faces a number of challenges that it 
must overcome in order to succeed. The first is to drive 
the production and publication of the new Area Plans as 
swiftly as possible. This will allow decisions on planning 
applications to made by local planners in a timely manner 
in order to prevent the previous backlog of applications 
which has happened in the past. Secondly, there is a 
need to clarify the role of the Department in terms of 
what applications are regionally significant and which 
applications should be dealt solely by local councils. 
Furthermore, how much reliance should local councils 
place on community planning (Figure 5) as part of 
the planning process? Will there be a requirement 
for a joined up approach to council decision making 
between the 11 Super Councils to make sure that the 
decisions reached are consistent? Reform of the NI 
Planning system will no doubt improve decision making 
and allow clear coherent lines to be drawn, but the 
real judgement will come when new planning policies 
are published and new Area Plans are drawn up for 
consideration. Will a bright new future for planning 
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The intensity of multilevel environmental governance disputes reflects inexorable pressure on all levels of government to meet 
the increasingly complicated challenges of regulation 
in an ever more interconnected world. In the United 
States (US), debate over the responsibilities of different 
levels of government are framed within our system 
of constitutional federalism, which divides sovereign 
power between the central federal administration and 
regional states1. Dilemmas about devolution have been 
erupting in all regulatory contexts, but environmental 
governance remains uniquely prone to federalism 
discord because it inevitably confronts the core question 
with which federalism grapples—“who gets to decide?”—
in contexts where state and federal claims to power are 
simultaneously at their strongest. 
Environmental problems tend to match the need to 
regulate the harmful use of specific lands (among the 
most sacred of local prerogatives) with the need to 
regulate border-crossing harms caused by these uses 
(among the strongest of national prerogatives). As a 
result, it is often impossible to solve the problem without 
engaging authority on both ends of the spectrum—and 
disputes erupt when local and national ideas on how best 
to proceed diverge. Ongoing jurisdictional controversies 
in energy policy, pollution law, and natural resource 
management reveal environmental law as the canary 
in federalism’s coal mine, showcasing the underlying 
reasons for jurisdictional conflict in all areas of law.
Wrestling with these incendiary tensions at the 
intersection of local land use and spillover harm, 
environmental federalism helpfully exposes the fault 
lines underlying the American federal system to 
analysis—but also the available tools for coping with 
them. American environmental law has developed 
structural means of managing these tensions which may 
be instructive for other devolution conflicts or claims 
for decentralised environmental decision-making in 
other jurisdictions. This article suggests a few potential 
lessons from the American experience.
In the US, environmental governance often contends 
with jurisdictional controversy through programmes of 
cooperative federalism, in which state and federal actors 
take responsibility for separate but interlocking roles 
within an overarching regulatory programme1. Statutes 
engage regulatory stakeholders across multiscalar lines, 
allocating responsibility according to the distinctive 
strengths of local and national capacity, seeking the best 
balance of flexibility, durability, and responsiveness for 
each individual context. Intergovernmental partnerships 
may involve direct state-federal cooperation, but 
they are often mediated by statutory structures that 
asymmetrically allocate decision-making authority 
within programmes of coordinated capacity, 
federally-supported state implementation, conditional 
pre-emption, and permitting programmes.
Multilevel environmental 
governance in the  
United States
Erin Ryan discusses the benefits of a dynamic multilevel 
governance approach by the US Government for cross- and 
inter-state environmental management.
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COORDINATED CAPACITY 
These programmes partner distinct regulatory skillsets 
of state and federal actors to operate independently in 
a shared regulatory space. For example, the Emergency 
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act engages 
state and local experts in coordinated planning for 
chemical and other emergencies2. It harnesses local 
capacity by requiring each state to establish an 
Emergency Response Commission drawing on technical 
expertise from all relevant state agencies3. It partners 
local expertise with federal capacity by authorising 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to require 
compliance by all relevant facilities with the emergency 
planning provisions created by each state’s commission3. 
This structure drew praise as an early cooperative 
federalism model, enhancing interjurisdictional synergy 
by trading a fully federalised response for one enabling 
more expert state implementation4. However, it was 
also criticised for not allowing states to opt out of 
participation in favour of direct federal regulation5. 
FEDERALLY SUPPORTED STATE IMPLEMENTATION 
In more complex programmes, the federal government 
often negotiates for local participation in multilevel 
governance through conditional spending, offering 
financial and technical resources to persuade states 
to help implement federal goals and to facilitate state 
accomplishment of related regulatory goals6. These 
programmes are attractive to the federal government 
because they enable Congress to negotiate with states 
for policymaking influence in regulatory realms that 
lie beyond more directly constitutionally enumerated 
federal powers7. They are attractive to states because 
they come with fiscal incentives and enable state choice, 
enhancing the potential for jurisdictional synergy while 
maintaining respect for local autonomy. For example, 
the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) enables 
each state to accept or reject the proposed partnership, 
because the law provides for no federal intervention if the 
state declines the federal invitation8,9. Another example is 
the Superfund Act, a federally administered programme 
that imposes liability for hazardous substances, but 
authorises discretionary grants to encourage state 
participation and leadership in clean-up efforts10. 
CONDITIONAL PREEMPTION 
A classic model of cooperative federalism pioneered by 
environmental law is that of conditional preemption, by 
which the federal government sets goals or standards 
that may be implemented by either state or federal 
actors. This model invites the states to participate in 
accomplishing an overall regulatory goal by tailoring 
the implementation of federal standards in the way 
that best suits local political, geographic, economic, and 
demographic circumstances. However, if a state declines 
to participate, the federal government will regulate 
in-state activity directly, preempting any conflicting 
state law. These programmes safeguard a centralised 
response while opening possibilities for preserving local 
autonomy and fostering interjurisdictional synergy. 
Many environmental laws deploy federally-supported 
state implementation and conditional pre-emption 
simultaneously, inviting state participation but 
guaranteeing a federal fall back if a state declines the 
invitation. For example, the Clean Air Act—perhaps 
uniquely among environmental law—uses conditional 
spending as less of a carrot and more of a stick. The Act 
establishes National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
and anticipates that states will design and administer 
State Implementation Plans for attaining them. If they 
do not, the federal government will eventually do so 
using a Federal Implementation Plan.  In the meanwhile, 
non-compliant states may suffer the loss of federal 
highway funds offered under a related conditional 
spending partnership11. The design of the Clean Air 
Act reflects its architects’ intentions that the federal 
government remains the clear senior partner, reserving 
dominant centralised authority to resolve a collective 
national problem. After all, air pollution results not 
only from activities solidly rooted in one place, but also 
from countless mobile sources (both domestically and 
internationally) that are less meaningfully related to 
local expertise and land use authority12.  
SHARED AND GENERAL PERMITTING PROGRAMMES. 
Most state/federal partnerships follow a model similar 
to the Clean Air Act, in which federal judgment usually 
trumps on regulatory goals and standards, while local 
judgment usually gets federal deference on matters of 
design and implementation that account for diverse local 
circumstances. In fact, environmental law has pioneered 
different ways of formalising this asymmetrical 
allocation of state and federal authority through its 
different approaches to shared and general permitting 
programmes. In shared permitting programmes like 
those of the Clean Air and Water Acts, state and federal 
actors share authority for permitting private activity 
that implicates the overarching regulatory goal. In 
addition, general permitting programmes provide 
a streamlined means of negotiating the satisfaction 
of regulatory goals when governmental actors are 
themselves permit applicants. 
General permits enable applicants to obtain permission 
to engage in regulated activity by following a general 
set of instructions that provide specific guidance about 
acceptable and unacceptable activity13. An under-sung 
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Drawing on these insights, governance architects could 
capitalise on the existing asymmetrical allocation 
of authority to more effectively engage insight and 
capacity at the local level, and to more strategically 
allocate roles among executive, legislative, and judicial 
decision-makers where each is most able. Federalism 
theory should also push regulators to recognise that 
many of the difficult jurisdictional dynamics that are 
formally recognised within state-federal relations are 
equally meaningful in municipal-state relations. While 
the US Constitution falsely presumes that municipal 
interests are synonymous with that of their state, 
federalism controversies over fracking and other energy 
harvesting, especially reveals intrastate conflicts. In 
addition, architects designing new regulatory models 
must consider all implicated governance values18, 
weighing carefully whether any one takes priority 
over another. The more all values are in equipoise, 
the more the regulatory framework should allow for 
adaptive management through ongoing deliberation 
among regulatory stakeholders. 
A key lesson of environmental governance is that 
there is no one size to fit all regulatory needs, and 
different federalism values may take priority under 
different circumstances. For example, the Coastal Zone 
Management Act (CZMA) establishes a federal statutory 
framework that enables multiple iterations of open 
bargaining between state and federal executive actors 
toward corresponding state legislation, providing a 
good example of how to integrate state/federal and 
legislative/executive capacity toward uniquely tailored 
regulatory endpoints, where place-based local diversity 
is the determinative factor19. A very different model is 
“ A key lesson of environmental 
governance is that there is no 
one size to fit all regulatory 
needs, and different federalism 
values may take priority under 
different circumstances.”
tool of cooperative federalism, they can maximise local 
discretion and minimise the overall regulatory burden 
on both ends, by facilitating locally tailored resolutions 
within exacting national guidelines. For example, the 
Army Corps of Engineers uses a general permit to protect 
wetlands under the Clean Water Act, allowing countless 
public and private actors to obtain land use permission 
with minimal regulatory oversight but according to a 
specified set of regulatory guidance13,14. The Clean Water 
Act also authorises municipal storm water discharges 
under a general permitting programme15,16,17.
LESSONS FROM DYNAMIC FEDERALISM 
The conventional tools of cooperative federalism provide 
critical forums for regulatory collaboration in realms 
of legitimate jurisdictional overlap, where the need for 
strong centralised response is matched by strong local 
capacity rooted in the states’ pre-constitutional police 
power. Indeed, environmental scholars—especially 
among the emerging dynamic federalism literature—are 
increasingly emphasising the values of overlap, fluidity, 
exchange, and negotiation among separately regulating 
local, state, and federal actors (see Box 1).
BOX 1. BALANCED FEDERALISM
Innovations in federalism theory, such as the Balanced Federalism 
model I’ve set forth in previous work, advocate for dynamic 
interaction among the various levels of government. For example, 
Balanced Federalism emphasises shared interpretive responsibility 
among both branches and levels of government, to achieve a 
balance among the competing values of multilevel governance that 
is both dynamic and adaptive over time1.
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taken by the Clean Air Act’s mechanism for regulating 
motor vehicle emissions, which enables states to follow 
either the federal or California standard, in order to limit 
the variability of regulation within the national market 
of automobile manufacturing while still enabling the 
benefits of regulatory competition20. This model enables 
effective dynamic interaction within a more centralised 
regime, in which the constraints of a national market are 
the most critical factor21. 
With so many considerations at play, it is hard to 
imagine environmental law—or any federalism-sensitive 
governance—reaching a definitive answer to the question 
of “who should decide?”. Strictly segregating state and 
federal efforts in interjurisdictional contexts is unlikely 
to work well, as demonstrated by failed environmental 
governance in the US over non-point source water 
pollution22. Yet leaving jurisdictional matters fully 
unresolved can also have serious consequences. Doctrinal 
uncertainty may deter effective regulatory problem 
solving where it is needed, if regulators fear becoming 
embroiled in legal challenges to their assertion of 
contested authority, as occurred during American efforts 
to regulate radioactive waste23. Alternatively, doctrinal 
uncertainty can encourage self-serving regulatory 
abdication, if all levels of government cast the regulatory 
dilemma as someone else’s responsibility24.  
Heeding these lessons, well-crafted multiscalar 
governance belies the perverse presumption of “zero-sum 
federalism,” which assumes that the allocation of 
decision-making authority among levels and agents 
of government is always a zero-sum game25. Defying 
the presumption that authority exercised by one is 
categorically removed from others, environmental 
governance has experimented with different ways of 
enhance authority among multiple agents simultaneously, 
through structured programmes of consultation 
and exchange. This empirical assault on the mythos 
of zero-sum federalism warrants emphasis, drawing 
attention to what most American federalism actually 
looks like in practice, and how federalism in practice 
increasingly departs from the rhetoric of conventional 
federalism theory25,26. 
CONCLUSION 
In the end, perhaps the problem that stymies all 
federalism-sensitive governance is the assumption 
underlying the question with which we began. “Who 
should decide?” presumes a simple answer, and in contexts 
of profound jurisdictional overlap, there is rarely a simple 
answer. American environmental federalism has shown 
that the best response is often to inform interjurisdictional 
governance with multiple perspectives as feasibly 
as possible, through ongoing processes of exchange, 
adaptation, and negotiation among stakeholders at all 
levels of jurisdictional scale. Balanced federalism suggests 
that similar principles apply to the allocation of decision 
making authority along the horizontal separation of 
powers. Good interjurisdictional governance engages 
not only the distinctive capacity at different levels of 
government vertically, but from the different branches of 
government within each level. Legislative, executive, and 
judicial coordination at all levels of scale are needed to 
manage the difficult trade-offs that federalism-sensitive 
governance always has, and always will, require of us.
© checubus | Fotolia
56 | environmental SCIENTIST | November 2016
CASE STUDY




Colin Reid discusses the impact 
of Brexit on environmental law 
development within the UK.
Effective measures to tackle environmental problems require action to be taken at many different scales. The fumes coming out of a chimney may contribute 
to global climate change, but they can also present 
a nuisance to neighbouring residents. It is therefore 
no surprise that the legal responses to environmental 
challenges also operate at different levels, but how these 
fit together can be far from simple.
With the summer’s referendum focusing attention on 
relations between the UK and the EU, it is easy to forget 
that in the regulation of environmental, and other, 
matters, there are other layers to be considered. Firstly 
there are the international law obligations which provide 
the background to much of what is done in a more 
detailed way by the EU and the UK. These obligations 
will continue to constrain the UK’s freedom of action 
even once withdrawal from the EU is complete. Secondly 
there is the distribution of power within the UK as a 
result of devolution. In the environmental context this 
means that when Brussels ceases to be responsible for 
key legislation, most powers will be moved not just to 
London, but to Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast. 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The role of international law is obvious when it comes 
to the big climate negotiations such as those in Paris last 
December, but the UK is a party to important treaties 
on many other matters such as air pollution, marine 
pollution, dangerous chemicals, trade in endangered 
species and ensuring public access to environmental 
information. The extent of such treaty obligations can be 
overlooked since in recent decades the measures needed 
to give effect to them have often been introduced into 
UK law through EU legislation. 
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These legal commitments will continue, regardless 
of membership of the EU. In practice, though, there 
are significant differences between obligations in 
international law and those under EU law. International 
obligations tend to be expressed in less detailed and 
less strict language, sometimes closer to aspirations 
than precise legal duties. International regimes usually 
lack the strong (if slow) measures provided by the EU 
structures to enforce compliance by states. Moreover, 
whilst the courts in the UK are bound to ensure that 
individuals can enjoy the rights conferred by EU 
law, the same does not apply for international law. 
Nevertheless, this extra layer of legal obligation can 
be significant in determining environmental policy.
DEVOLUTION 
The historic differences between the systems of 
courts, local government, landownership and criminal 
procedure (among others) have meant that there have 
always been differences in environmental law between 
the various nations of the UK. These differences are now 
increasing as a result of the devolution arrangements 
introduced at the end of last century (and in all 
cases significantly adjusted since then). The precise 
boundaries of the powers devolved to the authorities 
in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland vary, but in all 
cases environmental matters have been among the most 
significant areas that have become the responsibility 
of the devolved authorities. One consequence of this 
is that depending on the precise issue concerned, the 
UK Government may be responsible for the whole UK, 
for England alone or for England and any one or two 
of the other constituent nations.
The reality, of course, is that it is not possible to draw a 
clear line around what is an 'environmental' matter and 
defining the boundaries of devolved powers inevitably 
produced some awkward results, standing in the way 
of a holistic approach. For example, under the initial 
settlement, Scotland had responsibility for waste policy, 
but no power over the Landfill Tax which is one of the 
major levers to influence the quantity of waste produced 
and how it is dealt with; the additional powers given 
to Scotland in 2012 now authorise a distinct Scottish 
Landfill Tax.
There are some differences of policy between the 
different governments, on issues such as genetically 
modified organisms and nuclear power, and distinct 
administrative arrangements, such as the greater 
integration embodied in Natural Resources Wales. 
However, the scope for difference has been limited by 
the need to comply with EU law. One shared constraint 
on the powers of the devolved authorities is that they 
have no capacity to act in breach of EU law, so that 
all the governments are working within the same 
fundamental framework.
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to relax environmental laws in order to attract trade 
or investment.
To the extent that environmental policy is freed of EU 
or other external constraints, a greater volatility may be 
seen. The making of EU rules can be frustratingly slow, 
but once made, the law tends to 'stick'. The stability that 
this brings is welcomed by industries which can plan 
ahead and invest accordingly. It is also well-suited to 
the long-term programmes required to tackle major 
environmental problems such as water quality and 
climate change. The greater flexibility outwith the EU 
will enable quicker responses to changing circumstances 
and for the law to be better adapted to local needs, risks 
and conditions. On the other hand, such flexibility also 
brings a lack of certainty as to the future and the risk 
of policy being more vulnerable to short-term political 
currents and financial pressures.
A further consequence is that since environmental 
matters lie largely in the hands of the devolved 
authorities, the scope for greater differences within 
the UK will be increased. It is uncertain how far the 
devolved administrations will have the desire – and 
perhaps as importantly, the capacity - to develop their 
own distinctively different environmental laws on most 
issues, but undoubtedly there will be at least a drift, if 
not a stronger drive, towards greater fragmentation. This 
may in turn lead to exploration of mechanisms to ensure 
that a degree of coordination is retained, perhaps akin 
to some aspects of the current work of the Joint Nature 
Conservation Committee on wildlife issues.
CONCLUSION
The environmentalists’ slogan “Think global; act local” 
applies to the law as well as to our personal lives. 
Tackling environmental challenges requires action at 
many different levels, cutting across the various political 
boundaries which history has constructed. At present, 
the picture tends to be dominated by the EU level, but its 
actions may in fact be determined by wider international 
initiatives and in turn have to be implemented by the 
UK, and especially the devolved, authorities. With Brexit, 
the comparatively stable and geographically extensive 
framework provided by EU law will be replaced by 
something which has the potential to be much more local 
and subject to rapid change, for good or bad reasons. 
The one certainty is that the future of environmental 
law is becoming less certain.
“ The precise boundaries of the powers devolved to the 
authorities in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland vary, but 
in all cases environmental matters have been among the most 
significant areas that have become the responsibility of the 
devolved authorities.”
This does not mean that the law in each nation has to 
be identical. Most EU environmental law takes the form 
of Directives, which set out the results to be achieved, 
but leave it to each Member State, or each constituent 
government within a Member State, to ensure that 
their law produces this result. Thus, an EU Directive 
requires that all government plans and programmes 
within certain categories are subjected to a strategic 
environmental assessment before being adopted, 
but leaves it to each state to decide how to implement this, 
so long as the procedure that is put in place incorporates 
the prescribed elements of the assessment process. 
This leaves room for different states, and the 
different parts within a state where they have the 
relevant powers, to implement the basic requirements 
in different ways.
At the simplest level within the UK, the need to fit the 
different legal backgrounds and the different electoral 
and legislative timetables mean that some differences 
are inevitable. But other differences do reflect more 
substantive divergence. 
When Scotland came to implement the Strategic 
Environmental Assessment Directive, it was decided 
to apply this to all public sector plans and programmes, 
not just those in the categories specified in the Directive. 
The implementation of the Water Framework Directive in 
Scotland was taken as an opportunity for a far-reaching 
reform of water law which in England and Wales had 
accompanied the legal restructuring and privatisation of 
the water authorities at the end of the 1980s. Nevertheless, 
the scope for fragmentation of the law is considerably 
restricted by the need to comply with EU law.
The EU source of so many initiatives has two further 
consequences for environmental law across the UK. 
Firstly, the devolution legislation expressly allows UK 
Ministers to make regulations to implement EU laws 
across the UK, even in areas of devolved responsibility. 
This cuts across the standard division of power and 
responsibility, but has provided a convenient and 
effective way of acting where a measure cuts across 
devolved and reserved matters or where uniformity 
is desired. Secondly, the European Communities 
Act 1972 gives to Ministers, in the UK government 
and the devolved ones (within their areas of legal 
competence), wide powers to makes laws to give effect 
to EU obligations; the precise extent to which national 
legislation in specific areas allows Ministers to act has 
not needed to be tested in recent decades and if the 1972 
Act is repealed, some loopholes may emerge.
BREXIT
Withdrawing from the EU will have a major impact on 
environmental law in the UK. The need to comply with 
EU obligations has undoubtedly made UK governments 
bring about environmental improvements faster and 
more thoroughly than they would otherwise have 
done, and one of the most significant effects will be 
the loss of the EU structures as a means to call the 
UK government to account if it fails to live up to its 
environmental commitments. What else can be said 
about a post-Brexit future?
As noted above, the UK will not have a totally free 
hand in terms of environmental policy in view of its 
many obligations in international law, albeit that they 
cannot be enforced as strictly as those within the EU. 
Moreover, there will have to be a new legal relationship 
with the EU which will continue to affect the freedom 
to set standards on environmental and other grounds. 
Any close trade links, such as those within the European 
Economic Area, will still require the application of most 
EU standards, and it is worth noting that even the looser 
trade agreements between the EU and other states, such 
as the Ukraine or Canada, include provisions seeking 
high levels of environmental standards, the application 
of the precautionary principle and a commitment not 
Colin T Reid is Professor of Environmental Law at Dundee 
Law School and has taught environmental, constitutional and 
administrative law for many years. He has written widely on 
environmental regulation and frequently gives evidence to 
legislative and law reform bodies. (c.t.reid@dundee.ac.uk)
© david hughes | Fotolia
62 | environmental SCIENTIST | November 2016 November 2016 | environmental SCIENTIST | 63
OPINION OPINION

